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how it is arrived at." To something like this very issue we have tried to stick close, all the way through our attempt to place a critical estimate upon the pragmatist answer to the inquiry into the meaning of truth. The conclusion has been forced upon us that pragmatism constantly confuses these two questions, but that it answers satisfactorily neither of the two. In coming to this conclusion, however, we cannot confess to the charge of either stupidity or insincerity. We must, therefore, take our place, — and this we do with cheerfulness and alacrity, — among that great cloud of witnesses who, according to Professor James, "labor under an inability almost pathetic, to understand the thesis which they seek to refute" (p. xx). But we propose this final query: Of what *practical* use, whether for the conduct of life, or the advancement of science, or the uplift of moral ideals, or the administration of the faith and the consolations of religion, is a philosophy that makes so ineffective an appeal on the ground of its own truthfulness? But we may be permitted to placate our temper and to quiet our fears with the consciousness that our party, being protestant, is still greatly in the majority; and, in fact, seems at the very latest information to be gaining rapidly. So then, in due time and, we hope, in a short time, if the very few confirmed pragmatists prove unable to find for themselves a place where "the wicked cease from troubling," we, at least, may easily and safely retire where "the weary are at rest."

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Philosophische Strömungen der Gegenwart. By LUDWIG STEIN. Stuttgart, Verlag von F. Encke, 1908. — pp. xvi, 452.

The present volume is offered as an aid to a general view of the significant affiliations and oppositions of leading philosophical tendencies of the present day. The author hopes that it will lessen the waste of effort and confusion of thought resulting, in a time of active controversy and construction like the present, from mutual misunderstandings among thinkers and from imperfect definition of important issues. The first of the two parts into which the volume is divided consists of ten chapters, in which the several movements or tendencies in contemporary thought are presented and discussed. The six chapters of the second part purport to give a cross-sectional view, treating in a more constructive and affirmative way of the great problems to which the interest and efforts of the several schools are chiefly directed. Both parts deal for the most part with recent and contemporary German thought; a companion volume is promised which is to treat in the same way of English, French, and Italian philosophy.

The author's precise purpose has, I think, hardly been accomplished. The volume should prove a useful handbook, — with its seemingly encyclopædic citation of authors and titles, and its copious index of names, extending over seven double column pages. But the statements of standpoint and doctrine, while on the one hand lacking in the precision and definiteness of an encyclopædia article, do not, on the other hand, luminously merge, as the author intended, into a single comprehensive view of the contemporary situation. Several of the chapters appeared originally in philosophical journals, and were worked over for incorporation in the present publication. It is for this reason, perhaps, that the chapters of the first part differ in method, and are not equally comprehensive in the treatment of their respective topics. Of Stein's conception of the history of philosophy something will have to be said below, and it need only be mentioned in this connection, as to some extent responsible for the indistinctness of impression left by the several chapters and the whole. But the main reason is undoubtedly the separate treatment of the 'movements' and the 'problems.' The first part, because not frankly so intended, falls somewhat short of being a wholly satisfactory handbook. At the same time, the chapters are too encyclopædic in plan and scope to admit of effective correlation by the detached series of concluding chapters. Moreover, if these latter indicate the contents of a veritable cross-section through the stream of contemporary German thought, this is, at all events, in its proportions, not such a cross-section as the ten descriptive chapters prepare us to expect. On the whole, it would seem that the author's purpose might have been better accomplished by making the book essentially a statement and discussion of the problems at issue in their logical relations to one another, and by presenting, in connection with each problem, the complementary or conflicting contributions of the several schools and groups. At the close a brief résumé of the collective teaching of each school might have been given.

The first chapter treats of "The Neo-Idealistic Movement." In contemporary German philosophy, Stein points out, are presented over again the stages of the classical development from Kant to Hegel. From the Neo-Kantianism of the Marburg school and F. J. Schmidt and the Fichteanism of Windelband, Rickert, Eucken, Lipps, and Münsterberg, to the philosophy of Nature of von Hartmann, Drews, Ostwald, and Reinke, and the Hegelianism of L. W. Stern and of Münsterberg (in his latest work), there is a complete parallelism with the older movement. And among the idealists themselves there is

great diversity. "The prism of idealism in our day may indeed be said to show nearly the whole span of the rainbow colors" (p. 5). But instead of harmony and coöperation among the diverse idealistic tendencies, one sees only silent, mutual contempt or fratricidal strife. "Sie philosophieren aneinander vorbei," says Stein. "Is it not a reproach to us," he exclaims, "that the monism of the '*Welträtsel*'-deuter should so spread like wild-fire, while idealism can only follow scolding and ineffectual in the wake of Haeckel's triumphal chariot?" "We have today no one great philosophic tendency which controls all others or draws them all as tributaries into one mighty channel, but only many little tendencies, each one of which, thoughtless of its sources or outlet, runs its course as if there were no others" (pp. 5-6). And yet, says Stein, two great streams of thought *have* actually dominated the history of modern philosophy down to the present, — rationalism and voluntarism, the latter of these taking its rise from Kant. "Implicitly or explicitly, voluntarism is of the very essence of nearly all contemporary idealism" (p. 9). The remainder of the chapter is, accordingly, given over to an account of the voluntarist systems of Lipps, Windelband, Stern, and Münsterberg, with some reference to Wundt's contribution on metaphysics in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart* and to the dissenting views of Külpe. The moral of the situation would appear to be, in Stein's opinion, that in the definite correlation and adjustment of its rationalistic and voluntaristic ancestral tendencies, idealism has a unifying problem that should draw together all its scattering efforts. Meanwhile, idealists may have the assurance that their own dissensions and want of discipline have been hitherto the sole real source of their adversaries' strength.

The second chapter, under the title "The Neo-positivist Movement," presents a rather impressionistic account of the pragmatism of James, preceded by an enumeration of the more important literature of pragmatism in German, French, and English, and a discussion of the history of the term. "Pragmatism," says Stein, "is, in its intention, even though perhaps not in ultimate consequences, nothing but a theory of truth." But if its first interest was in the problem of truth, pragmatism's solution of this problem is of such a sort as to bring with it fairly definite implications in other departments of philosophy. "Pragmatism is nominalistic in the theory of knowledge, voluntarist in psychology, energistic in the philosophy of nature, agnostic in metaphysics, and in ethics, melioristic on the principles of Bentham and J. S. Mill,—but with all this versatility, pragmatism is no external grouping of unrelated doctrines, but shows that organic

unity which, according to Goethe, is the mark of a work of genius" (p. 65). One wonders whether Stein here remembers his earlier insistence (pp. 42-43) upon the essential identity of the pragmatist theory of truth with the theory of knowledge and cosmic teleology of Stoicism and how far he would carry the parallelism between the two coherent systems, — whether, for example, he would interpret Stoicism also as agnostic in metaphysics and melioristic on the principles of Bentham and Mill in ethics. One suspects some flaw in the identification expressly alleged, — although which, if not both, of the two theories of knowledge may be the one misconstrued would be a more suitable matter for consideration elsewhere.

Stein's criticism of pragmatism concludes the chapter (pp. 65-75). "The *voir pour prévoir* of Comte is the initial principle of pragmatism." But purposiveness is only a regulative, not a constitutive; principle, and it is, according to Stein, due to this limitation that the pragmatist theory of truth cannot possibly rise higher than relativism. As a matter of fact, every doctrine of purposiveness must be deductive; for only by resort to some assumed primary "constant" can it avoid the anarchy of making "not *man* but *the* man the measure of all things" (p. 71). This is as true of James's variant of the purposive philosophy as of any other, — for all its "cult of fact, its freedom from hypothesis, its genetic theory of truth" (p. 69), — and accordingly the "constant" in pragmatism is none other than the criterion of "power to work," — by which Stein appears to mean an ideal of economy in the agent which requires an accurate valuation of conceptions according to their "power to work." James's seeming unawareness of the true *a priori* character of this principle, amounts to a lapse into the inconsequences which he himself long since pointed out in the associational psychology (p. 70).

In the next chapter, with the "energism" of Ostwald for a main theme, Stein discusses recent developments in the philosophy of nature and of science, giving brief mention to Mach, Lipps, and others, and to some of the adverse critics of the movement. Stein accepts the disparaging judgment passed by Dretske upon the neo-Fichtean "schulmässige Naturphilosophie" of Lipps's contribution to the *Festschrift* for Kuno Fischer. Fairly launched in Ostwald's Lübeck address of 1895, energism had had the way prepared for it by the earlier independent labors of Clifford, Mach, Lange, and the German-American Stallo. To-day, Stein assures us, the educated multitudes are turning away from their older allegiance and toward the energistic philosophy, "um den metaphysischen Dogmatismus des 'Welträtsel'-Materialismus den Halb- bis Sechszehntelgebildeten zu überlassen."

The other chapters of Part One deal respectively with the romanticism of Chamberlain and Keyserling, the neo-vitalism of Driesch, Reinke, and others, the realism of von Hartmann, Erhardt, Busse, and Külpe, Spencer's conception of evolution, the individualism of Nietzsche and Stirner, Dilthey's development of the standpoint and conception of the "Geisteswissenschaften," and finally the personality and work of Zeller. The chapter on romanticism shows Stein's allusive method of exposition and rhetorical facility of style in their most tantalizing form. One who has not already made the acquaintance of Chamberlain's *Die Grundlagen des Neunzehnten Jahrhunderts* will find himself at a loss to appreciate either the force of Stein's strictures upon certain phases of the argument or the merits of his high estimate of the importance of the movement. "In Chamberlain and Keyserling are still alive all of the motives of the older French and German romanticism, but they have purged away all that is avowedly mystical, nebulous, confused and abstruse, showing us a new romanticism scientifically deepened and logically made clear. . . . They have shaken men's faith in the autocracy of the logical consciousness. . . . With searching of heart and singleness of purpose, it is now the duty of all rationalists and intellectualists to check the movement before its spread grows to a devastation" (pp. 157-158).

Vitalism, for Stein, has only a symptomatic importance as a natural reaction against the dogmatic finality of materialism. Toward the close of the chapter (p. 173), are cited with apparent approval the critical objections against vitalism set forth by Kurd Lasswitz in his recent *Seelen und Ziele* (1908). In his discussion of realism, Stein insists upon the indebtedness of all contemporary branches of the general tendency to Trendelenburg (pp. 198-199). The chapter treating of the evolutionary movement is in fact an account, drawn largely from the *Autobiography*, of Spencer's intellectual relations and affinities to some of his English contemporaries and to German thinkers. The last chapter, entitled "Die Philosophiegeschichtliche Bewegung" turns out to be, in the main, a highly interesting appreciation of the personality and life work of Eduard Zeller. A notable feature is the account of Zeller's general philosophic views (pp. 283-292). Of the logic of the history of philosophy or of contemporary aims and methods in the study of the history of philosophy, the chapter has little to say. Stein quotes with approval at the end of the chapter these words of Alois Riehl: "Was, trotz der verschiedenen Gesichts- und Ausgangspunkte der Forschung, ungeachtet der Ausschliesslichkeit — und selbst Feindlichkeit — des Systems, absehend

endlich von Unterschied der Zeitalter und Personen, sich als gemeinsame übereinstimmende Lehre herausstellte, darf unbedenklich als sichere Grundlage und wirklicher Ertrag der Forschung in die Philosophie der Gegenwart eingehen" (p. 293), — a method of gaining results in philosophy which, it would seem, must presently bring the actual course of philosophy to an untimely close. Stein's own procedure in his historical chapters happily does not perfectly exemplify this method, but it is in general his tendency to emphasize resemblances, being satisfied to dispose of the outstanding "differences" shortly, as matters of "color" rather than of "essential tendency," as accidental *nuances* rather than essential characteristics.

Three of the six chapters of the second part are given over to the problems of sociology and ethics, a share of the author's cross-sectional view for which the cursory historical notice of the individualism of Nietzsche and Stirner stands as a very inadequate counterpart. The first, second, and sixth chapters deal with the problems of knowledge, of religion, and of history. The two former are eclectic and irenical, apparently endeavoring to make no contribution, and accordingly avoiding recognition of most of the issues upon which contemporary discussion turns. For example, Stein declares himself (p. 296) as "an empiricist in respect of the origin of our general concepts, but an '*a priorist*' or rationalist in respect of their validity." The third chapter, entitled "The Sociological Problem," deals mainly, after the manner of the descriptive chapters, with the views of Ratzenhofer and Herbert Spencer.

For the rest, one welcomes the three concluding chapters with their interesting, if not profound, discussions of toleration, authority, and the problem of history. Toleration and authority Stein suggestively conceives as necessary aspects of any living and developing social organization, and therefore as having a much wider inclusion than has ordinarily been ascribed to them in the discussions of philosophers and jurists. "Toleration means bearing with others' peculiarities; consideration for others' feelings, usages, ways of looking at things, convictions, and customs (*Sitten*); respect for the principles, views of life, and æsthetic preferences of our fellows; and finally, respectful treatment of alien races who differ radically from ourselves in religion or civilization, in political tendency or social organization. . . . True toleration always individualizes; it never ventures to pass general judgments" (p. 379). And the ancestral germ of conscious toleration is the imitative impulse, a process of exchange between conscious beings, which, as Ostwald would have it, is but one manifestation of

the universal cosmic principle of exchange of energy for energy (pp. 385-386). Or again, "Toleration is nothing but a special case of the tendency toward equilibrium in nature — toleration is the tendency toward social equilibrium" (p. 389). The limitations of Stein's view are thus perhaps sufficiently apparent, but his treatment is suggestive in its breadth and in its recognition of the problem as one worth separate discussion as such, — even though stopping short of the recognition that toleration is the negative aspect of a social attitude which looks toward affirmative reconstruction. In a similarly broad sense, Stein, following Jerusalem, defines authority (or the recognition of it) as "the acceptance, without proof, of another's judgment" (p. 402). But authority is no mere "historical category"; it derives from a "psychological category, from an irrevocable spiritual constraint, which shows itself in that need for authority which is a distinctive characteristic of human kind" (pp. 407-408). This spiritual need, however, "is grounded on the solid rock of biological utility. . . . Sie ist eine Reflexbewegung auf dem Gebiete des Willens" (pp. 411-412). "What the sciences are for thought, that authority is for conduct" (p. 413). Here, as elsewhere, however, Stein's fondness for a well-balanced parallelism leads him astray. Science is not merely a body of established truths, but a constructive *procedure* also, and the limitations of Stein's whole treatment come from his failure to recognize just this essentially spiritual aspect of the individual's attitude toward moral and political authority. For Stein, authority is a biological reflex without which "die anarchische Willkür des Individuums" (p. 414) would run riot. Wherever this is the whole truth (and is it ever so, even on the biological level?), does it ever come to pass, as Stein says it has among ourselves, that "wir setzen selbst Autoritäten ein" (p. 419)? And finally, Stein's conception of the problem of history shows a kindred limitation. For him the problem is that of the extent to which knowledge of the historical past, like knowledge of external nature, may be relied upon as a basis for the prediction of the course of events. His conclusion is the obvious one that history from this point of view, warrants only "schätzungsweise geäußerte Mutmassungen, also problematische Urteile über die Gestaltung des Kommenden, aber keine astronomische Sicherheit in der Voraussage des historischen Geschehens" (p. 440). Apparently this is Stein's adjudication of the opposed sociological and idiographic conceptions of Lamprecht and Rickert. He seems in this to miss the point at issue, — which to the present writer appears in the last analysis, to be just the problem of the logical motives of

historical study and the meaning of the historian's results, — not whether history can play well or not so very well a part analogous to that of natural science.

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L'année philosophique, publiée sous la direction de F. PILLON.

Dix-neuvième année — 1908. Paris, Félix Alcan, 1909. — pp. 283.

The nineteenth number of *L'année philosophique* presents a thoroughly creditable volume, although not perhaps one which will gain special distinction in comparison with the other issues of this highly satisfactory periodical. It is composed, as usual, of four regular articles and an extended series of short book reviews. To a larger degree than usual, however, the articles are themselves but critical summaries of current philosophical production in France.

The first article, by M. Rodier, on *The Functions of the Syllogism*, is offered as a development in a special direction of the doctrine of the late Octave Hamelin. The author aims at an interpretation of the syllogism from the point of view of intension, with the purpose of throwing light upon the essential nature of deductive reasoning. He sees in the principle and forms of the syllogism the characteristic life of the universal in the thought of man, an activity in which the conceptual order of reality comes to conscious expression and interpretation with us. He avoids, however, an excess of abstractionism, and is on his guard particularly against that misuse of the universal as an abstract generality which it is customary to associate with orthodox Platonism. After analyzing in a penetrating and suggestive manner the nature of the syllogism in itself he passes to the derivative forms which arise in its application to the conditions of the abstract sciences. This enables him to explain some of the artificialities of the traditional formal logic. It enables him especially, however, to deal with the nature of mathematical reasoning and its relation to syllogism, in such wise as to maintain that the two are at bottom identical in principle. The sixty pages devoted to this study will be of high interest to the logician.

The second article, by M. Victor Egger, *On Certain Texts Concerning Socrates*, examines an oft-quoted remark of Victor Cousin, that "Socrates brought philosophy down from the heavens to the earth." The author shows that this statement rests upon a misquotation from Cicero, whose remark in turn rests upon a misquotation from an earlier anonymous writing, the original of which would give a quite different meaning. He shows, also, that the passage in question affords a very inexact idea of the Socratic revolution.